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The Failure of the International Court of
Justice to Effectively Enforce The Genocide
Convention
Geoffrey S. DeWeese*
"Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned"
The Second Coming - William Butler Yeats
PREFACE
The collapse of the UN safe-area of Srebrenica took place over the
course of a few days in July of 1995. Starting with shelling on July 6,1
the Serbs who surrounded the town began to indicate an intent to break
a long stalemate. By July 10 they had control of the southern portion of
the enclave right up to the town's edge.2 On July 11 the town was
abandoned by both the Muslim inhabitants and the Dutch Peacekeep-
ers assigned to protect it; the safe-area ceased to exist. 3
What occurred over the next few days is hard to accept, but there is
no hiding from it. The town split up into two groups. Most of the
women, children and elderly walked the two miles up to the Dutch
headquarters in Potocari, on the northern edge of the safe-area. 4 Some
10,000 to 15,000 others, mostly men and boys, both civilians and sol-
diers, started off in a long column through the mountains and woods of
western Bosnia in hopes of making it to Muslim controlled Tuzla. 5
* The author is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of Law and a
sergeant in the Army Reserves. He would like to thank his wife Melody, who listened to
many draft ideas and helped edit the final version into a coherent article. Thanks also to
his parents for everything.
1. See DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S
WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II 3 (1997).
2. See id. at 115.
3. See id. at 161-66.
4. See id at 163 -64.
5. See id. at 179-80.
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In Potocari on July 12, the Serbs, led by General Ratko Mladic, be-
gan a process of loading the refugees on buses and trucks for transpor-
tation to Muslim controlled Bosnia. 6 However, they herded out most of
the men and held them separately.7 Meanwhile the men trudging their
way through the hillsides came under attack, and soon the long line
was spread out and in disarray.
8
On Friday, July 14, two men found themselves crowded into the
same gymnasium. 9 Mevludin Oric had been part of the march to Tuzla,
but, like so many he had been captured along with his cousin Haris. 10
Hurem Suljic had been one of the old men pulled away from his family
in Potocari on July 12 as the Serbs "evacuated" Srebrenica's civilian
Muslim population to eastern Bosnia. 1 Now they were both held pris-
oner along with some 1,000 to 1,500 other men.12 That afternoon Gen-
eral Mladic arrived and conferred with the other Bosnian Serb officers,
laughing and smiling.'
3
Shortly after Mladic left, the Serbs began to herd the prisoners into
a smaller room in groups of fifteen to twenty; within half an hour Oric
and his cousin were part of one such small group to be taken.'4 They
were blindfolded and put in the back of trucks. 15 After a short ride they
were pulled out of the truck; moments later shots began to ring out.'
6
About five hours later Suljic was taken out of the same gym, blind-
folded and put in the back of a truck.17 As it drove away, Suljic peeked
out from under his blindfolded and was surprised to find that he, at
fifty-five, was the youngest man in the truck.'8 Looking out the back of
the truck he saw the horrific sight of hundreds of dead bodies laying in
rows with a bulldozer busy digging a mass grave. 19 Taken out of the
truck, the men were herded to the end of a row of bodies, and the Serbs
6. See id. at 204-05.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 225-228.
9. See id. at 272-74.The events described come from interviews conducted with the
two by former Christian Science Monitor journalist David Rohde for his book ENDGAME.
Throughout the book he only recounted events which he could either independently iden-
tify (he was one of the first to reach the sites of the mass graves) or which he felt were
trustworthy. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at ix-xi.
10. See Id. at 272-74.
11. See id. at 206-07.
12. See id. at 288.




17. See id. at 294.





Somehow neither Oric and Suljic were hit, and by playing dead
amongst the other victims they survived until nightfall when they
found each other and escaped.21 Oric's cousin, who's dead body lay
across his legs all day, and hundreds of others did not survive.
22
The story of Mevludin Oric and Hurem Suljic is not the only one
which survives the war in Bosnia. What happened to them and those
with them is typical of the genocide that occurred. According to the Red
Cross, 7,364 people are still missing from Srebrenica alone, with 19,323
listed as missing from the entire war. 23 To put this into perspective, af-
ter the ten year Vietnam war period, which involved over two million
Americans, there were only 2,097 missing.
24
I. INTRODUCTION
Three years before the fall of Srebrenica, on March 6, 1992, Presi-
dent Alija Izetbegovic declared independence for the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina following a national referendum. 25 Exactly one month
later, as war was breaking out in the former Yugoslav republic, the
European Community extended the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegov-
nia recognition as an independent nation. 26 The next day, April 7, Bos-
nian Serbs anounced their formation of a separate "Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina." 27
Less than a year later, on March 20, 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina
("Bosnia")28 filed a complaint with the Registry of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting proceedings against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ('Yugoslavia") alleging
violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.
29
20. See id. at 295-96.
21. See id. at 291-93, 298-300, 302-304.
22. See id.
23. Michael Kelly, Where are the Dead? THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 1998, at 36-37.
24. Id. at 37.
25. JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA, RECORD OF A WAR CRIME 72
(1996).
26. See Steven J. Woehrel, Bosnia -Herzegovina Background to the Conflict 4, (CRS
Report for Congress No. 93-106 F,1993).
27. See id.
28. In researching for this article I found Herzegovina also to be spelled with a c in-
stead of a z - Hercegovina. Not being a linguist myself, I have simply opted for the former
spelling as it is what is used by the ICJ. In addition, I have tried to stick to using "Bosnia
and Herzegovina" as the Court does, rather than the alternate form of "Bosnia-
Herzegovina."
29. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
1998
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The ICJ has yet to reach the merits of the case. Over the course of
the past five years the ICJ has ruled on issues in three main categories:
the indications of provisional measures, 30 preliminary objections to the
Application and to the ICJ's jurisdiction to hear the case, 31 and the
permissibility of counter-claims. 32 It was while the ICJ was dealing
with these procedural issues that Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian
Serbs, leading to the disappearance and suspected mass murders of so
many Bosnian Muslims. 33 As the case continued to drag on in The
Hague, the war in Bosnia was brought to an uneasy end under the Day-
ton-Paris Peace Treaty and UN Peacekeepers were replaced by NATO
forces.
34
The Bosnian war and the case it spawned before the ICJ serve as a
reminder that violence in the form of genocide and warfare cannot be
stopped in the courtroom. Perhaps the ICJ is not the place to settle
disputes over issues as pressing as genocide. The procedures of the
Court, and the lack of enforceability of its judgments outside of the ac-
tions of the U.N. and good will of the nations who are parties to it, do
not meet the need for swift action when the issue is not only the placing
of blame for acts of genocide, but the prevention of such ongoing acts.
The Convention refers to both Prevention and Punishment, but while
the ICJ ponders who should be punished, it has been utterly ineffective
in the more immediate and more important work of preventing geno-
cide.
To keep the Court's deliberations in perspective, I will spend a por-
tion of this paper reviewing the social and political history of the Bal-
kans and of the war that erupted there as the former communist state
of Yugoslavia disintegrated. I begin by reviewing the history of the re-
gion up to the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. With this foundation,
I will then present the holdings that have characterized the three
phases of the litigation before the ICJ so far, along with some of the
commentary from various judges. Next, I will review the events that
were taking place in Bosnia while the case was being drawn out. I will
tenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 3-4 (Order of Apr. 8, 1993). Hereinafter I will only provide the ci-
tation and name of specific issuance rather than name the entire case each time. There-
fore all LC.J. references will be to this one case unless otherwise stated.
30. 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Apr. 8, 1993); 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13,
1993).
31. Judgment of July 11, 1996 (visited Sept. 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edulici/icj4tjudgment.htm>.
32. Order of 17 December 1997 (visited Jan. 15, 1998)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ibhy/ibhyorders/ibhyorder971217.html>.
33. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 36-37.
34. See Craig Whitney, "Seize the Chance" Balkan Plan Signed; Real Work Ahead,
THE DENVER POST, Dec. 15, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10205318.
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conclude then with some personal observations and questions which I
feel arise from both the case itself and its impact (or lack thereof) on the
people of Bosnia.
II. HISTORYTO 1992
Prior to its acceptance by the world community as an independent
state in 1992, there had never been an independent state of Bosnia. 35
Settled in the seventh century by Slavic peoples, the area in which Bos-
nia now rests was at the conflux of various world powers over the cen-
turies.36 To the west lay the Roman Catholic Church which was fol-
lowed by the Croats, and to the east the Orthodox Church was pre-
eminent and supported by the Serbs. 37 In the fifteenth century the con-
quest of Bosnia and the surrounding region by the Ottoman Empire
brought Islam into this mix of religious ideals, and many people, both
peasants and nobles, converted as a means of keeping their land.
38
Bosnia was becoming a focal point for international tension as the
Christian nations in Europe came to feel threatened by such a large and
strong Islamic state in Europe itself. In 1875 Slavs in Serbia and Mon-
tenegro intervened in an uprising in Bosnia and soon rebellion had
spread throughout the region. 39 Sensing an opportunity to weaken its
Ottoman enemy and gain valuable territory, Russia stepped in to sup-
port its Slavic neighbors. 40 In March of 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano
gave the Russian Empire a triumphal victory and freed the Slavic
states from Ottoman rule.
41
The new borders laid out at San Stefano, however, didn't last very
long as the rest of Europe became concerned with Russian expansion.
In June and July of 1878 the lines were once again redrawn and terri-
tory redistributed by the Congress of Berlin. 42 As part of the new struc-
ture, Bosnia and Herzegovina was given to the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire to administer. 43 While these new developments disappointed
Russia, they angered Serbia and Montenegro and the Balkans contin-
ued to be a source of contention among the European powers. 44
Within the Balkans, religion may have divided the people, but they




39. THE WESTERN HERITAGE SINCE 1300 926 (Donald Kagan et al. eds., 4th ed. 1991).
40. See id.
41. See id.
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were all of Slavic ancestry and spoke variations of the same language. 45
These peoples had found themselves ruled by various nations over the
centuries - Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Russia. 46 There was a
growing movement of Slavic nationalism at the start of the twentieth
century aimed at a union of the South Slavs (Yugoslavs) into an inde-
pendent nation.47 Serbia hoped to be the state that would unite these
disparate peoples.
48
In 1908 Turkey began to regain some of its strength which led to
the official annexing of Bosnia by Austria. 49 This angered the Serbs
who had hoped to create a greater Yugoslav state, and it also antago-
nized Russia.5 0 However, Germany, Austria's partner in the Dual Alli-
ance, tacitly supported the move. 51 In the ensuing years two small wars
broke out in the Balkans and the various alliance that held Europe to a
fragile stability began to strain under the pressure.52 Finally the assas-
sination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne, in Sara-
jevo in 1914 by a Bosnian Serb nationalist proved to be too much and
like dominoes the various European powers fell victim to their own alli-
ances and one by one were drawn into war.
5 3
It is important to understand that during that first decade of the
twentieth century, the Bosnians themselves were divided as to who
they wanted to be aligned with. The Croats (about 18 percent of the
population) wanted to stay a part of the Austrian Empire as a Croatian
state. 54 Most of the Serbs (some 42 percent of the population) supported
uniting with Serbia. 55 The Muslim population, (just over 31 percent of
the population) descendants of those who converted under the Ottoman
occupation, were claimed by both sides as simply being "Islamicized
members of their group." 56 For their part, the Muslims wanted to be re-
turned to the Ottoman Empire.57 Even at this stage division was taking
root within the diverse population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
At the end of World War I the Serbs achieved their goal as the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was established to include Croatia, Bosnia,






51. See id. at 932.
52. See id. at 932-34.
53. See id. at 934.






Montenegro, and Serbia.5 8 This new state was by no means without
disharmony, and while the Serbs did provide some religious toleration
and reform of landownership provisions to protect Muslims, many of
them emigrated to Turkey.59 In 1941 Yugoslavia was conquered by
Germany and it became part of a puppet Croatian state run by Croatian
fascists who stated as a goal the expulsion of a third of Serbs, conver-
sion to Catholicism of another third, and to kill the final third.60 The
Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were treated as potential allies
who simply had to be converted. 61 While many Muslims did side with
the Fascists Ustashe, others turned to the Communist Partisans. Soon
the Ustashe, Partisans, and the royalist Chetniks were fighting each
other and hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians were killed.6
2
The Partisans were led by Josip Broz, better know by his later
name - Tito.63 In 1943 Churchill determined that Tito was "killing the
most Germans" and so he was given British support which lead to his
Partisans becoming the dominant force in the war and in post-war
Yugoslavia. 64 Tito ran Yugoslavia until his death in 1980, and under
his leadership the republics, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, were
given wide autonomy under the 1974 Constitution.65 Tito's regime also
recognized the Muslim population as a national group, not just a relig-
ious one. 66
Following Tito's death, Yugoslavia suffered both economic hardship
and corruption scandals, and by the late 1980s Serbian nationalist Slo-
bodan Milosevic had risen to power.67 As the 1990s began, the various
republics become more self-assertive with non-Communist governments
in Slovenia and Croatia advocating a loose federation, and Serbia
pushing for more unity. Bosnia saw the formation of multiple parties
from the various ethnic groups, and a coalition government was formed
under Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim. 68 In 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia
declared independence from Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's
Army (YPA) used Bosnia as a staging ground in an attempt to regain
the republics, an act which increased tensions between Croats and
Serbs within Bosnia. 69 Several Serb autonomous regions were declared
58. THE WESTERN HERITAGE, supra note 39, at 955.




63. See EDGAR O'BALLANCE, CIVIL WAR IN BOSNIA: 1992-94 18 (1995).
64. Id. at 18-19.
65. Woehrel, supra note 26, at 2.
66. See id. at 2-3.
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by the Serbian Democratic Party within Bosnia which announced they
would secede should Bosnia claim independence. Croatian regions fol-
lowed suit, saying they would stay as long as Bosnia didn't become
Serb-dominated.
70
Nevertheless, in December of 1991 Bosnia applied to the European
Community (EC) for recognition as an independent state after the EC
gave the various republics a deadline for such action.7 1 A referendum
was held on February 29 and March 1, 1992, in which independence
was approved by 99.4 percent of the 63.4 percent who turned out for the
vote (Serbs, 31 percent of the population, had boycotted the vote).
72
While the three sides (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) initially agreed to a
plan to divide Bosnia into separate cantons with wide autonomy, too
many factors remained unresolved and on April 4 Bosnian Serbs, sup-
ported by the YPA, began attacks which escalated with EC recognition
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April. 73 The next day the "Serbian Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was announced by Serbs and an
army commanded by YPA general Ratko Mladic soon had control of
two-thirds of the new nation's territory. 74 While in May the YPA for-
mally declared it was withdrawing from Bosnia, all Bosnian born YPA
soldiers (nearly 80 percent) were told they could keep their equipment




Far from the violence and anarchy of the Balkans, the Peace Palace
in the Hague, Netherlands, provides a luxurious and impressive home
for the ICJ. In 1946, the ICJ was formed as an organ of the United Na-
tions and took over where the Permanent Court of International Justice
left off.76 Two years later the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) was adopted







76. See ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1946-1996 98-99
(1996). The first sitting of the ICJ occurred on April 18, the same day the League of Na-
tions and the Permanent Court of International Justice voted themselves out of existence.
Id. at 99.
77. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted
December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force January 12, 1951) [hereinafter
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and the ICJ which both replaced international bodies that had existed
prior to World War II, the Genocide Convention was a reaction to the
horrible events of the war itself.
The Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) is the 91st case to come before
the ICJ since its founding,78 and the second time the ICJ has been
asked to adjudicate on the Genocide Convention. In 1951 the ICJ is-
sued an Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide. 79 In what Judge
Stephen Schwebel, the current president of the ICJ, has called a "land-
mark opinion,"80 the ICJ held that the Genocide Convention was "in-
tended by the General Assembly and by the contracting parties to be
definitely universal in scope."8'
Unlike the case of Bosnia v. Yugoslavia, this earlier case was an
advisory opinion only, and it wasn't until Bosnia filed its Application
that jurisdiction was claimed under Article IX of the Genocide Conven-
tion.8 2 Under Article IX, "[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties
relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present
Convention... shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute."
83
B. Orders for Provisional Measures - April 8 and September 13, 1993
1. Order of April 8, 1993
In its Application to the Court filed on March 20, 1993, Bosnia
asked the ICJ to make numerous declarations, not all specifically re-
Genocide Convention]. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention until
1988, and then only subject to certain reservations, the first being that "before any dis-
pute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of Justice under [article IX of the Conventions], the specific consent of
the United States is required in each case." U.S. Reservations and Understandings to the
Genocide Convention, November 25, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 782.
78. See EYFFINGER, supra note 76, at 384.
79. 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
80. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Roles of the Security Council and the International
Court of Justice in the Application of International Humanitarian Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 731, 734 (1995).
81. Reservations to the Convention, supra note 77, at 23.
82. Genocide Convention, supra note 77, Article IX.
83. Id.
1998
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lating to the Genocide Convention.8 4 In addition to alleging violations
of the Genocide Convention, Bosnia also asked the court to declare that
Yugoslavia had violated the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Hague
Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the United Nations Charter, and other principles of cus-
tomary international law.8 5 Further, Bosnia asked the ICJ to declare
that under the circumstances, any Security Council resolutions relating
to the former Yugoslavia should not be construed as preventing Bosnian
self-defense and its right to acquire weapons from other states.8 6 In
light of the violations of the various treaties and customary law, Bosnia
next asked to ICJ to order Yugoslavia to "cease and desist" such viola-
tions, specifically from acts such as "ethnic cleansing," mass rapes, de-
struction of communities and religious institutions, bombardment of ci-
vilian populations, the continuing siege of population centers,
starvation of civilian populations, interference with delivery of humani-
tarian supplies, from all uses of force against, and violations of the sov-
ereignty of Bosnia, and any support of those who were engaging in mili-
tary actions against Bosnia.8 7 Finally, the ICJ was asked to declare
that Yugoslavia had to pay reparations to Bosnia for the damages it had
inflicted.8 8
In addition to the Application, Bosnia also requested that the Court
immediately indicate various provisional measures which would be in
effect while the Court was seized of the case.89 The provisional meas-
ures requested were for Yugoslavia to stop the alleged violations and to
stop providing aid to any group engaged in military actions against
Bosnia, and that the Court declare that Bosnia should be allowed to
procure arms for its self-defense. 90
In response to Bosnia's requests, Yugoslavia asked for provisional
measures of its own, which in many respects mirrored Bosnia's. The
measures asked that Bosnia be ordered to stop any actions aimed at
Serbs living in Bosnia, that Bosnia disband prison camps, stop the de-
struction of Orthodox churches, observe a cease-fire agreed to on March
28, 1993, and cease the practice of "ethnic cleansing."91
On April 1 and 2, 1993, the Court heard oral observations from
both sides dealing with the preliminary measures.92 In its Order the
84. See 1993 I.C.J. 3, 4-8 (Order of April 8, 1993).
85. See id at 4-5.
86. See id. at 5-6.
87. Id. at 6-7.
88. See id. at 7.
89. See id. at 7-8
90. See id. at 8.
91. Id. at 9-10.




... on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before
deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate
such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant or found
in the Statute appear prima facie, to afford a basis on which the juris-
diction of the Court might be established .... 93
Based on this understanding, the Court concluded that it could find
a prima facie basis from the Genocide Convention.94 It first noted that
Article IX gave the Court jurisdiction to hear disputes relating to the
application of the Convention. 95 Next it determined that both Bosnia
and Yugoslavia had succeeded to the commitments of the former So-
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which had been a signatory of
the Genocide Convention.
96
Bosnia also presented as an additional basis for jurisdiction a letter
to the President of the Arbitration Commission of the International
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia from the Presidents of Serbia and
Montenegro. 97 In this letter, the Presidents stated that any legal dis-
putes which could not be settled between the various former Yugoslav
republics should be presented to the ICJ.98 Bosnia maintained that this
meant that any disputes between the former republics should be
brought to the ICJ, but the Court disagreed. Instead, it interpreted the
letter as only dealing with the specific disputes which were before the
Arbitration Commission at that time.99 As such, it could not be consid-
ered to rise to the level of a prima facie basis of jurisdiction. 10 0
Since the Court had established that the Genocide Convention was
the only basis upon which its jurisdiction might be found, its next task
was to determine what provisional measures it could indicate. 01 After
discussing the provisions of the Genocide Convention in light of the
claims of both parties, the Court stated that "the circumstances require
it to indicate provisional measures."1 02 But before laying out its order
the court noted that
the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudges the
93. Id. at 11-12.
94. See id. at 16.
95. See id. at 14. For test of Article IX, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96. See 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Order of April 8, 1993), at 15-16.
97. See id. at 16-17.
98. See id. at 17.
99. See id. at 18.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 19.
102. Id. at 23.
1998
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question of the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the merits of the
case, or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application,
or relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the right of
the Governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia to submit ar-
guments in respect of those questions. 103
Essentially the court was reassuring both sides that whatever deci-
sions the court made regarding provisional measures, such decisions
would not prejudice either party regarding the claims made at the mer-
its.
The Court unanimously voted first (in paragraph 52 A(1)) that
Yugoslavia should "take all measures within its power to prevent com-
mission of the crime of genocide."'10 4 Next, by a vote of 13 to 1 (Judge
Tarassov against) (paragraph 52 A (2)) the Court declared that Yugo-
slavia "should in particular ensure" that any military or paramilitary
organization under its control or influence, or supported by it, "do not
commit any acts of genocide" against Bosnian Muslims or anyone
else. 105 Finally the Court, again voting unanimously (in paragraph 52
B), declared that both Yugoslavia and Bosnia "should not take any ac-
tion and should ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate or
extend the existing dispute over the prevention or punishment of the
crime of genocide or render it more difficult of solution."10 6
Judge Tarassov stated in an appended Declaration to the Order
that he voted against the second measure due to his fear that it would
be construed as a pre-judgment of Yugoslavia's guilt, despite the courts
earlier declaration that preliminary measures would not bias the merits
of the case. He also dissented because he stated that Yugoslavia may
not have control over all who claimed to be subject to it. 107
2. Order of September 13, 1993
Before long the ICJ found itself once again confronted with issues
of provisional measures. 108 On July 27, 1993, four months after the fil-
ing of the Application and its requests for provisional measures, Bosnia
filed a second request for provisional measures which was based upon
the facts alleged in the original request, as well as a few new allega-
tions.10 9 Once again Bosnia asked that the Court immediately order
Yugoslavia to stop providing any type of support to any groups in Bos-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 24 (paragraph 52 A (1)).
105. Id. (paragraph 52 A (2)).
106. Id. (paragraph 52 B).
107. See id. at 26-27.
108. 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13, 1993).
109. See id. at 332.
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nia, that Bosnia be allowed to buy weapons, ammunitions and supplies
from other nations to facilitate its self-defense, and that other nations
be allowed to provide such aid.11 0 The new requests were that all Yugo-
slavian officials, "especially the President of Serbia, Mr. Slobodan
Milosevic" stop any plans to acquire any territory in Bosnia, that the
Court declare that all contracting parties to the Genocide Convention
have an "obligation" to prevent Genocide in Bosnia, and that United
Nations Peace-Keeping Forces must "do all in their power" to get hu-
manitarian aid to the people of Bosnia.'
Once again Yugoslavia countered with its own request, asking the
Court to order Bosnia "to take all measures within its power to prevent
commission of the crime of genocide against the Serb ethnic group."
112
Before hearings occurred on August 25 and 26, 1993, the two sides were
allowed to appoint judges ad hoc as they did not have representation on
the Court." 3 Bosnia choose Elihu Lauterpacht to represent it, and
Yugoslavia appointed Milenko Kreca.
114
Yugoslavia again objected to Bosnia's standing before the Court,
but the ICJ rejected that contention as having been previously settled
in its Order of April 8.115
The Court next turned its attention to examining the various addi-
tional basis of jurisdiction presented by Bosnia to determine if any of
them established the required prima facie evidence of jurisdiction. 1 6
Bosnia presented the Court with a 1919 Treaty signed by the Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," 7 the letter to the President of the
Arbitration Commission presented in its previous request, 1 8 and vari-
ous customary and conventional laws of war such as the Geneva Con-
ventions, the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, and the Nuremberg
Charter, Judgment, and Principles. 1 9 The Court rejected each of these
as not having been shown to provide any basis of a prima facie case
upon which provisional measures could be based.
120
110. See id. at 332-333.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 334.
113. See id. at 335.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 337.
116. See id. at 339.
117. See id. The full name was the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers
(the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on the Protection of Minorities, signed Sept.
10, 1919.
118. See 1993 I.C.J. 325, 340-41 (Order of September 13). See also supra notes 99-100
and accompanying text.
119. See 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13) at 341.
120. See id. at 340-41.
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Bosnia also asked the Court to find jurisdiction based on Yugosla-
via's own requests for provisional measures, some of which Bosnia
claimed went beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention. 121 The
Court also rejected this basis noting that subsequent requests had all
stayed within the limits of the Genocide Convention, and further that
Yugoslavia had constantly denied that the Court has jurisdiction on any
basis including the Convention. 122 Under such circumstances the Court
said Yugoslavia's actions cannot be interpreted as an unequivocal and
voluntary acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.123 The Court concluded
that only the Genocide Convention had been shown to provide a prima
facie case basis for jurisdiction.
124
In filing a second request for provisional measures, Bosnia had to
show that those further measures requested were necessary for the pro-
tection of a legal right. 25 However, the Court determined that only one
of the eight legal rights which Bosnia sought to be protected was based
on the Genocide Convention, "the right of the People and State of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina to be free at all times from genocide and other
genocidal acts perpetrated upon Them by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), acting together with its agents and surrogates in Bosnia and
elsewhere." 126 Therefore, only measures aimed at this right would be
considered.127
The Court determined first that those measures which sought to
allow or require other nations or entities to provide weapons and sup-
plies to Bosnia, or which were directed to Bosnia's right to receive such
weapons and supplies were essentially attempts to have the Court clar-
ify the role of outside parties and as such were beyond the scope of the
Genocide Convention. 128 Further, the Court determined that requests
aimed at protecting Bosnia's physical territory were not within the
scope of the Genocide Convention which was aimed at protecting people,
not territory. 29 Finally, in examining the last remaining request, that
Yugoslavia stop supporting in any manner to any groups or individuals
in Bosnia, the Court found that it was nearly identical to measures re-
quested in Bosnia's first request, except that it was broader in scope.130
However, inasmuch as this request did not specifically invoke the Geno-
121. See id. at 341.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 341-42.
124. See id. at 342.
125. See id. at 344.
126. See id. at 343.
127. See id. at 344.
128. See id. at 344-45.
129. See id. at 345-46.
130. See id. at 346.
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cide Convention, it was outside the legal scope. 131
In response to Yugoslavia's request that Bosnia be ordered to pre-
vent the genocide of Serbs, the Court did find that the request was di-
rectly connected to the Genocide Convention, but that it had already
been met by the Order of April 8 and as the circumstance had not
changed, there was no need for more specific measures.
132
In concluding its examination of the requests of the two parties, the
Court made known its frustration at the continued genocidal actions
taking place in Bosnia. 133 Despite its Order of April 8, the Court noted
that "great suffering and loss of life has been sustained by the popula-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina in circumstances which shock the conscience
of mankind."'134 The Court was clearly frustrated at the continued
fighting taking place, despite numerous Security Council Resolutions
condemning the ethnic cleansing and other violations of international
law, which only aggravated the dispute before it. 135 It flatly stated that
it was "not satisfied that all that might have been done has been done
to prevent commission of the crime of genocide." 136 The Court concluded
that what was required was not new indications of provisional meas-
ures, but simply an adherence to the ones already in place. 137 It there-
fore voted again on the operative paragraphs from its Order of April
8.138 First, by a vote of 13 to 2, the Court reaffirmed paragraph 52 A
(1), next, by a vote of 13 to 2, it reaffirmed paragraph 52 A (2) and fi-
nally, by a 14 to 1 vote, the Court reaffirmed paragraph 52 B. 139 Judge
Tarassov changed his vote in favor on the first order to an against vote,
and Judge ad hoc Kreca, voted against each one.
140
While no judges had done so with the Order of April 8, a number of
them did attach opinions to this Order. One issue of interest to the
various judges was whether or not provisional measures are legally
binding. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen took the view
that they need not be found to be legally binding in order to impart a
duty on a party. 141 He expressed the opinion that a provisional measure
is essentially a "judicial finding" and "any non-implementation, even if
not in breach of a legal obligation, represents an inconsistency with that
131. See id.
132. See id. at 346-47.
133. See id. at 347-49.
134. Id. at 348.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 348-49.
137. See id. at 349.
138. See Id. at 349-50. See supra, notes 104-06 and accompanying text for specifics of
these paragraphs.
139. 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13) at 349-50.
140. Id. at 349-50.
141. See id. at 367 (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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judicial finding."'142 While he admitted that the Court had no power to
penalize non-implementation (which he felt Yugoslavia was guilty of),
he did think the Court should consider such factors when presented for
requests by the non-implementing party (in this case Yugoslavia), and
that "it would not be correct" to act upon requests for measures by such
parties. 143
Judge Weeramantry felt it was important to distinguish the ques-
tion of whether provisional measures were legally binding from the
question of enforcement.144 He was of the opinion that the question of
enforceability was secondary to that of validity. 145 It is clear in reading
Judge Weeramantry's opinion that he did indeed view the question of
whether such orders are binding as one "whose importance transcends
the matter presently before the Court, important though it be."'146 After
examining various sources for an answer to this question, Judge
Weeramantry concluded that the provisional measures did impose a le-
gal obligation, and that this was especially important as the issues be-
fore the Court touched upon "the very existence of a people."'147 Any-
thing short of such an understanding would be "out of tune with the
letter and spirit of the Charter and the Statute."'
148
Faced with non-compliance of the parties as to the first indications
of provisional measures, Judge Ajibola asked, "Must the Court make
orders in vain?"'149 He felt that the first Order of April 8 had not been
complied with, 150 but found the question of its binding effect to be a dif-
ficult one. 151 Nevertheless, he agreed with Judge Weeramantry's con-
clusion that they were binding, for "[1]ogic and common sense would
consider it ridiculous and absurd for the Court to be unable to preserve
the rights of the parties pending the final judgment."'152 After all, he
reasoned, if the Court could not issue binding orders for such measures,
the Court would not have been given such power in the first place by
the Statute and Rules of the Court. 153 As to enforceability, he pointed
out that the Court relies on the Security Council to ensure enforce-
ment. 5 4 Ultimately, he stated that the order "should be binding and
142. Id.
143. Id. at 368.
144. See id. at 374 (Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 374.
147. Id. at 380.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 394 (Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola).
150. See id.
151. Id. at 397.
152. Id. at 399.
153. See id. at 400.
154. See id. at 401.
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enforceable, otherwise, ab initio, there may be a good and reasonable
ground to question its being issued at all."' 55
Judge Tarassov dissented because of his view that it was dangerous
to impute responsibility to one nation for the acts of an ethnically ho-
mogenous group residing in another nation. 15 6 By his negative votes, he
reaffirmed the apprehensions he had felt when the first request was
presented in Bosnia's Application. 157 He felt the Court should have
made reference to the need of both parties to achieve a peace agreement
at negotiations in Geneva.
58
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht wrote a Separate Opinion in which he
carefully addressed and defended the merits of each and every measure
requested by Bosnia, as well as the various claims for jurisdiction pre-
sented by Bosnia.e 9 His approach to the case was laid out early in his
Opinion: "[T]he circumstances call for a high degree of understanding
of, and sensitivity to, the situation and must exclude any narrow or
overly technical approach to the problems involved."'160
Judge ad hoc Kreca, for his part, took the opportunity to attack the
Order of April 8 upon which the current Order was based. 16 1 Judge ad
hoc Kreca felt that the request failed to meet the qualifications of the
definition of "people" in the Genocide Convention.' 62 He pointed out
that Bosnia as a nation was actually a mix of ethnic communities, and
as such was not a homogeneous people which could claim to fall under
the Genocide Convention. 63 He further disagreed with the Court over
the existence of any facts which would be the basis for provisional
measures or jurisdiction.1
64
Rather than granting Bosnia any new provisional measures, the
Court only voted to re-affirm the Order it had rendered on April 8,
1993. Considering that the Court seemed to recognize that the earlier
Order did not have the desired effect, it is hard to understand how the
Court expected it to change the situation this time around. The case
dragged on for another three years before the Court determined that it
had jurisdiction to hear the case at all. It was during this time that
Srebrenica fell. The provisional measures had no effect on the thou-
sands who died in the aftermath of the town's end.
155. Id. at 406.
156. See id. at 449 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tarassov).
157. See id. See also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
158. See 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of September 13) at 451.
159. See id. at 407-48 (Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 453.
162. See id. at 454.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 457-58.
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C. Jurisdiction - July 11, 1996
Following the pair of Orders for the indication of provisional meas-
ures, the Court granted the parties a series of extensions for the filing
of Bosnia's Memorial and Yugoslavia's Counter-Memorial. 65 However,
by an Order of July 14, 1995166, the proceedings on the merits were sus-
pended when Yugoslavia filed preliminary objections relating to the
admissibility of the Application and to the jurisdiction of the Court. 167
Bosnia was given until November 14, 1995 to present its observations
and statements concerning Yugoslavia's objections. 168 After Bosnia
filed its statement, Yugoslavia submitted to the Court the text of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
("Dayton-Paris Agreement"). 169 Nearly four months after the uneasy
peace agreement had been signed, public hearings were held on Yugo-
slavia's Objections between April 29 and May 3, 1996.170
After presenting Bosnia's requests as stated in its Memorial, 171 the
Court laid out seven preliminary objections argued by Yugoslavia. 172
They first attacked the jurisdiction of the court over the case (as well as
the date at which any possible jurisdiction would have begun to run)
and next they attacked the admissibility of Bosnia's Application in the
first place. 173 These objections altered slightly in form at oral argu-
ments, specifically with Yugoslavia dropping one of its objections to
admissibility and expanding on its arguments concerning when any ju-
165. See 1993 I.C.J. 470 (Order of October 7, 1993) (stating that at the request of Bos-
nia, it was given a six month extension for the filing of its Memorial to be due on April 15,
1994, and thus extending to 15 April 1995 the time-limit for the filing of a Counter-
Memorial by Yugoslavia) and 1995 I.C.J. 80 (Order of March 21, 1995) (stating that at the
request of Yugoslavia, over objections by Bosnia, the time-limit for the filing of Yugosla-
via's Counter-Memorial was extended to June 30, 1995).
166. 1995 I.C.J. 279, 279-80 (Order of July 14, 1995).
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Judgment of July 11, 1996 (visited Sept. 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/judgment.htm>, paragraphs 9 and 10. The Dayton-
Paris Agreement was initialed in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris
on December 14.
170. See Judgment of July 11, 1996, supra note 169, at paragraph 12.
171. See id. at para. 14 (On Behalf of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the
Memorial). Bosnia presented seven requests to the Court, the first five all asking for the
ICJ to adjudge and declare that Yugoslavia was in some manner guilty of violations of the
Genocide Convention, the sixth called upon Yugoslavia to restore the situation which ex-
isted before the violations occurred, and the seventh asked to ICJ to require Yugoslavia to
pay reparations to Bosnia for "damages and losses caused." Id. Bosnia also reserved the
right to invoke other basis of jurisdiction should Yugoslavia challenge the Genocide Con-
vention as grounds for jurisdiction. See id.





risdiction that may be found in the Genocide Convention would begin. 174
1. Jurisdiction Issues
The ICJ first tackled the issue of whether the two parties were
bound by the Genocide Convention. Yugoslavia was bound, the Court
said, because of its indications to the international community and to
the United Nations that it would assume all the treaty obligations of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 75 Additionally, since
Yugoslavia had never contested that it was a party to the Genocide
Convention, it was therefore bound by the provisions therein.
176
The larger question presented by Yugoslavia's objections was
whether Bosnia was a party to the Convention. The Court determined
that Bosnia was for two reasons. First, as Bosnia had given to the Sec-
retary-General of the U.N. a Notice of Succession which was accepted
by the Secretary-General as a valid succession by a recognized member
state, it had legally succeeded to the treaty. 177 Second, by way of being
accepted as a member of the United Nations, Bosnia may have been en-
titled to "automatic succession. " 17 The Court concluded that in either
case it was clear that as of the filing of the Application on March 20,
1993, Bosnia was a party to the Convention.
17 9
This determination led the Court to examine Yugoslavia's conten-
tions that even if Bosnia was considered a party to the Genocide Con-
vention, any actions taken under the Convention would be limited to af-
ter Bosnia became a party. 180 Yugoslavia argued that Article XIII of the
Convention required a 90 day wait period before accession would be fi-
nal, which would put the date at March 29 (90 days after Bosnia gave
its Notice on December 29, 1992). 181 Essentially, Yugoslavia was saying
that Bosnia was not a party to the Convention until after it had submit-
ted its Application, and therefore the Application was invalid. The
Court replied that Article XIII did not matter since Bosnia was deter-
mined to have become a party through succession. 182 Further, even if it
174. See id. at para. 15 (On Behalf of the Government of Yugoslavia, At the hearing on
2 May 1996). Another interesting change was that in the written objections Yugoslavia
referred to Bosnia as the "so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," but in the oral ar-
guments they dropped this caveat and referred simply to "Bosnia-Herzegovina." Compare
para. 14 with para. 15.
175. See id. at para. 17.
176. See id.
177. See id. at paras. 18-20.
178. Id. at para. 21.
179. See id. at para. 23.
180. See id. at para. 24.
181. See id. at para. 24.
182. See id.
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was the case that Bosnia was not actually a party until March 29, that
would only mean that the Application was a few days early, a problem
which Bosnia could have at any time remedied.18 3 The Court said it
would not penalize a party to a dispute over a minor procedural error
which could have been easily remedied.
18 4
Yugoslavia's fifth objection claimed that as the conflicts in Bosnia
were domestic in nature, there was not international dispute, and that
Article IX of the Genocide Convention18 5 did not apply to issues of state
responsibility.18 6 The Court dismissed the first part of this objection by
pointing out that Yugoslavia's part in the genocide was exactly what
was at dispute and such arguments belonged to the merits of the
case.18 7 As to the second part of this objection, the Court disagreed with
Yugoslavia's interpretation of Article IX of the Genocide Convention
and determined that it conferred jurisdiction not only to issues dealing
with a state's obligation to prevent and punish crimes of genocide, but
also to acts of genocide committed by the state or its subsidiaries 188.
Yugoslavia had also argued that if the court were to find jurisdic-
tion based on the Genocide Convention, it could only deal with events
that occurred after the Convention became binding on the parties.1 8 9
However, the Court determined that since there was no indication in
the Convention of a limit to its jurisdiction ratione temporis, and no
such reservations were presented in the Dayton-Paris Agreement, its
jurisdiction extended to the beginning of the conflicts in Bosnia.1 90
Finally, the Court addressed the various additional bases of juris-
diction presented by Bosnia. 191 These were essentially the same bases
which the Court had rejected as not presenting a prima facie basis for
jurisdiction in the Orders of April 8 and September 13, 1993, regarding
provisional measures. 192 The Court again rejected them as being a
bases of any jurisdiction, and concluded that only the Genocide Conven-
tion would apply in this case. 193
183. See id.
184. See id. at para. 26.
185. For text of Article IX, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
186. See Judgment of July 11, 1996, supra note 169 at para. 29.
187. See id. at para. 31.
188. See id. at para. 32
189. See id. at para. 34.
190. See id.
191. See id. at para. 35.
192. See id. at paras. 37-39. See also supra notes 97-100, 116-120 and accompanying
text for ICJ's treatment of these bases in its Orders of April 8 and September 13, 1993.
193. See Judgment of July 11, 1996, supra note 169, at para. 41.
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2. Admissibility of the Application
Having rejected Yugoslavia's objections to the jurisdiction of the
Court, the ICJ could then turn to the objections based on the admissi-
bility of the Application. 9 4 The first of these dealt with Yugoslavia's
contention that the complaint dealt only with actions that occurred
during a civil war which it was not a part of.195 However, the Court
pointed out that this was part of the dispute to be resolved on the mer-
its, and therefore rejected this objection for the same reason it had re-
jected Yugoslavia's fifth objection.196
Yugoslavia's second objection maintained that Bosnian President
Alija Izetbegovic was not the legal president at the time of the filing
and as such could not have authorized the filing of the Application.
197
The Court dismissed this by pointing out that Izetbegovic was recog-
nized as the Head of State by the United Nations as well as the Dayton-
Paris Agreement, and as such was presumed under international law to
be able to act on behalf of his country.198 Therefore the Application was
admissible. 199
3. Votes and Attached Opinions
The Court voted 14 to 1 to dismiss the preliminary objections re-
lating to the admissibility of the Application (Judge ad hoc Kreca voting
against). 2°° The vote was 11 to 4 to dismiss the fifth preliminary objec-
tion relating to jurisdiction (Judges Oda, Shi, Vereshchetin and Judge
ad hoc Kreca voting against).2° 1 Next, by 14 to 1 the Court voted to
dismiss the preliminary objections relating to the start of jurisdiction
under the Genocide Convention (Judge ad hoc Kreca voting against).
2° 2
The Court then found that it did have jurisdiction to hear the dispute
based on the Genocide Convention by a vote of 13 to 2 (Judge Oda and
Judge ad hoc Kreca against), and by 14 to 1 it dismissed the additional
bases of jurisdiction presented by Bosnia (Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht
against).2° 3 Finally, by 13 to 2, the Court found Bosnia's Application to
194. See id. at para. 42.
195. See id. at para. 43.
196. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
197. See id. at para. 44.
198. See id.
199. See id.
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be admissible (Judge Oda and Judge ad hoc Kreca against).20 4
Much as Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht had proceeded to comment in
detail on each of Bosnia's requests for provisional measures and Bos-
nia's claimed bases of jurisdiction in his Separate Opinion to the Order
of September 13,205 Judge ad hoc Kreca wrote an extensive Dissenting
Opinion in which he examined and supported each of Yugoslavia's pre-
liminary objections in detail.20 6 Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht amended a
Declaration stating as he had thought Bosnia's claims for additional ba-
sis for jurisdiction presented a prima facie case in his Separate Opinion
of September 13, he found no reason to believe that they were not valid
still.207
Judges Shi and Vereshchetin wrote a Joint Declaration to explain
why they voted against the dismissal of the fifth preliminary objection
concerning jurisdiction. 208 While they agreed that the Court had juris-
diction over cases dealing with the Genocide Convention, they felt that
the Convention should be properly understood at affecting individual
acts, not state acts. 209 Therefore they felt there was not a dispute which
the Convention could address.2 10 Judge Oda expressed a similar view-
point in his Declaration. 211 He also felt that the Genocide Convention
was aimed at preventing actions by individuals, not by states, and he
felt that this prevented the Court from exercising jurisdiction as well as
making the Application inadmissible. 212 He did add, however, that his
vote on this matter would not prejudice the position he might take on
the merits. 21
3
Judge Shahabuddeen's Separate Opinion explained his views on
the issues of treaty succession and forum prorogatum.2 4 Judge Parra-
Aranguren wrote his to express his opinion that in its request for provi-
sional measures Yugoslavia had admitted that Bosnia was a party to
204. Id.
205. See supra, notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
206. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4kreca.htm>. Printed off of the internet, his Dissent
filled standard ninety standard 8 1/2 by 11 inch pages.
207. See Declaration of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edulicj/icj4llauterpa.htm>. See also supra, notes 159-60 and ac-
companying text.












the Genocide Convention and that he would have put more emphasis on
the proper manner in which Bosnia succeeded to the Convention due to
the Convention's humanitarian nature. 215 Judge Weeramantry also ad-
dressed the issue of automatic succession to treaties in his Separate
Opinion.
21 6
Many legal issues were dealt with in the Court's Judgment con-
cerning Yugoslavia's preliminary measures. Yet however important or
interesting those issues were, they were not helpful to those suffering
the genocide. The Judgment came on July 11, 1996, exactly one year to
the day after Srebrenica's Muslim inhabitants and their UN protectors
had to abandon the town. Was this on the mind of the Court when it
handed down its decision? Was the war on their minds as they ap-
proved the various requests for extensions (by both sides it should be
noted) to the time-limits? Nevertheless, the Court was finally ready to
proceed to the merits of the case, the end almost seemed in sight.
D. Counter-Claims - December 17, 1997
On July 22, 1997 Yugoslavia presented its Counter-Memorial to the
ICJ within the time-limit the Court had given it.217 Included in its
Counter-Memorial were various counter-claims which Yugoslavia asked
the Court to adjudge and declare.218 The Counter-Memorial first asked
that the Court declare that no acts punishable by the Genocide Conven-
tion had occurred as either the acts alleged had not happened, or there
was no intention of committing genocide, and/or no acts had been aimed
at individuals just because of their ethnic or religious affiliation. 219
Second, it asked that the Court reject all of Bosnia's claims since the
alleged acts of genocide were not committed by any organ of Yugoslavia,
nor in Yugoslav territory, nor at the order of Yugoslavia. 220 Third, it
asked that Bosnia be held responsible for acts of genocide against Bos-
nian Serbs as a violation of the Genocide Convention.221 Fourth, it
asked that the Court declare that Bosnia has an obligation to punish
215. See Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/parra.htm>.
216. See Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry (visited October 2, 1997)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icj4/weeraman.htm>.





221. Id. Yugoslavia gave numerous examples of the genocide it claimed, including the
texts of Bosnian newspapers, one of which printed the following song: "Dear mother, I'm
going to plant willows, / We'll hand Serbs from them. / Dear mother, I'm going to sharpen
knives, / We'll soon fill pits again." Id.
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those responsible for acts of Genocide. 222 Fifth, the Court was asked to
declare that Bosnia must take "necessary measures" so that such "acts
would not be repeated in the future."223 And Sixth, it requested that
Bosnia be ordered to eliminate all consequences of the violations and
"provide adequate compensation."224
When Bosnia objected to the counter-claims of Yugoslavia, both
sides were asked to present written observations on the issue to the
Court.225 Bosnia requested that the portion of the Counter-Memorial
which constituted counter-claims be dismissed as they were not "di-
rectly connected ... with the subject-matter of the initial proceedings"
as was required by Article 80 of the Rules of the Court.226 Bosnia
claimed that if Yugoslavia wanted to institute proceedings, it should
file an application through normal channels. 227 Yugoslavia replied that
the counter-claims arose from the same general facts and were founded
on the same jurisdiction, i.e. the Genocide Convention, 228 and therefore
"the counter-claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the
claim."
2 29
The Court observed that while a claim should normally be made by
means of an application, certain claims are allowed to be introduced as
incidental proceedings in order to "ensure better administration of jus-
tice."230 The Rules of the Court did not define what was meant by "di-
rectly connected," and therefore the Court determined it was up to its
"sole discretion" based on "the particular aspects of each case" to deter-
mine the answer.231 The Court concluded that since Yugoslavia would
be relying on the same facts under the Genocide Convention as Bosnia,
the counter-claims were directly connected and as such were admissi-
ble.2
32
The vote was 13 to 1 in favor of allowing the counter-claims and
setting up a time-frame for Bosnia to reply to them and Yugoslavia then
to submit a rejoinder (Judge Weeramantry against).233
Judge ad hoc Kreca wrote a Declaration in which he expressed con-




225. See id. at paras. 6-25.
226. Id. at para. 10.
227. See id. at para. 16.
228. See id. at para. 18.
229. Id. at para. 24.
230. Id. at para. 30.
231. Id. at para. 33.
232. See id. at paras. 34, 37.
233. Id. at para. 43.
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by Yugoslavia would therefore be considered "a secondary claim."234 He
did not like the assumption which might arise that Bosnia's claim
would be looked to as the "principle claim," or the more important
claim. 235 Rather, he would view Yugoslavia's claim as a rival claim,
putting the parties in comparable positions to those involved in a terri-
torial dispute.
236
Judge Koroma submitted a Separate Opinion detailing his frustra-
tion that by approving the counter-claims, the Court was extending fur-
ther a case which had already lasted too long.237 As he noted, this case
involved "allegations of grave breaches of the Genocide Convention and
other massive violation[s] of human rights."238 While he agreed that
the counter-claims were admissible, he wished that the Court could
have taken action to speed up the process so as to not "appear to com-
promise the proper administration of justice." 239
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, while voting with the Court and seem-
ingly against the party that appointed him, wrote in his Separate
Opinion that he felt both parties should have been given the opportu-
nity to present oral arguments. 240 He also voiced his opinion that the
Court could have "exercised its discretion in the present case by de-
clining to join the otherwise admissible counter-claims to the principal
claims."2 4 1 Nevertheless, despite his reluctance to "see the complexity
of this case magnified" by adding the counter-claims, he felt there was
no other satisfactory solution. 242
Weeramantry, now Vice-President Weeramantry, focused on three
areas in his dissent: 1) the meaning of "counter-claim", 2) the Courts
discretion to accept a counter-claim, and 3) involvement of third states
due to the counter-claim. 243 On the first issue, he stressed that a coun-
ter-claim must actually counter the original claim, and further, that
such claims are not accepted under criminal law. 24 4 Since genocide is a
crime against humanity, counter-claims are not appropriate when ex-
amining such an issue.245 As to the second issue, Vice-President
Weeramantry echoed his colleague Judge Koroma by maintaining that
the Court could have used its discretion to deny the counter-claims as a
234. Id. at para. 1 (Declaration of Judge ad hoc Kreca).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id. at para. 2, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht.
241. Id. at para. 19.
242. Id. at para. 22.
243. Id. at Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry.
244. See id. at (a) - The meaning of the Term "Counter-Claim."
245. See id.
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means of moving towards a conclusion to the case.2 46 However, Weera-
mantry would have used such discretion where Koroma in the end did
not.247 Finally, the Vice-President expressed his concern that the coun-
ter-claims might lead to the necessity of involving Croatia in the case
which could cause further delays. 248 Due to these considerations which
he believed "would have been more in accordance with legal principle
and practical convenience," Vice President Weeramantry would have
proceeded to the completion of the Application, allowing Yugoslavia to
take advantage of its right to file a separate application of its own at a
later time.24
9
E. Current Status - January 22, 1998 to ?
As its deadline approached for submitting a Reply to Yugoslavia's
Counter-Claims, Bosnia asked for an extension.250 The Court granted
Bosnia's request with no objections from Yugoslavia, and by an Order
on January 22, 1998, it extended to April 23, 1998 the time-limit for
Bosnia to file its Reply, and to January 22, 1999 the time-limit for
Yugoslavia to file its Rejoinder. 251 While the case has moved on to the
merits, there is no indication that this stage of the proceedings are in
any way close to reaching a conclusion.
IV - HISTORY SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Prior to the filing of Bosnia's Application in March of 1993, the war
had progressed steadily. Over the course of the five years since the case
had been before the ICJ, the war in Bosnia continued until an uneasy
peace was finally established under the Dayton-Paris treaty. This next
section will review the course of the war during the course of the case.
By May of 1992 the Serbs had gained control of about sixty percent
of the Bosnia.25 2 As town after town fell and people were forced to flee,
a pattern began to emerge.253 First roadblocks manned by YPA troops
would appear around town, followed by a warning for Serb inhabitants
to evacuate. 254 As soon as they left, the remaining Muslims and Croats
found themselves subject to heavy artillery fire, occasionally from posi-
246. See id. at (b) - The Discretion of the Court.
247. See id.
248. See id. at (c) - The Involvement of a Third State.
249. See infra at Conclusion.
250. See Order of January 22 (visited February 5, 1998) <http://www.icj-
cij.orglidocketlibhy/ibhyorders/ibhyorder980122.html>.
251. See id.





tions across the border. 255 The townspeople left would thereby be forced
into hiding for hours or days, until they were "softened up sufficiently
by the [YPA]'s artillery, [and] paramilitary groups would move in."
256
It seems that these paramilitary groups were effectively run by the
Serbian government, even though they were not directly linked to Bel-
grade. 257 Even some Serb government officials, perhaps wanting some
credit, emphasized that the paramilitaries could not function without
Serbian support.258 This seems confirmed by the fact that logistically
they had to be supplied by Yugoslavia or else they would have run out
of ammunition and weapons. 259 As towns and villages were overrun by
the Serbs, detention camps were set up to house the prisoners, and ac-
cording to one U.N. report, the primary purpose of these camps was the
permanent removal of anyone in a leadership position.
260
By the end of May 1992 the lines seem to stabilize and did not
change much until the summer of 1995.261 In western Bosnia only a few
pockets remained outside the control of the Serbs, including Gorazde,
Srebrenica and Zepa. 262 Over the summer and into autumn people be-
gan fleeing the Serb controlled areas as they methodically "cleansed"
their new holdings, and by the end of the year about two million people
were refugees.
263
Srebrenica was one area that fought back. 264 While they held onto
an enclave around their town, they were soon faced with another prob-
lem, they were cut off from the world and needed humanitarian assis-
tance badly. 265 The fighters in Srebrenica, led by twenty-five year old
Naser Oric, who, ironically, had been a bodyguard to Serbian President
Milosevic, continued to do as much damage to the Serbs as possible, and
were responsible for many brutal counter-attacks. 266 Soon, however,
outside help was needed and it came in the form of French General
255. See id.
256. Id. at 73-74.
257. See id. at 75.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), para. 175, quoted in HONIG & BOTH, supra
note 25, at 76-77. The report also referred to these camps as "concentration camps," a
name which conjures up images of Hitler's Holocaust. Id.
261. See id. at 77.
262. See id.
263. Id. This number was nearly half the population of Bosnia and was mostly Mus-
lim. Id.
264. See id. at 77-79.
265. See id. at 79-80.
266. See id. at 77-81. He led an attack on the Serbs on Orthodox Christmas that re-
portedly left over a hundred soldiers and civilians dead in the town of Kravica. Id. at 81.
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Philppe Morillon, UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia. 267 Fearing for
the safety of over 60,000 civilians packed into the small town of Sre-
brenica, on March 11, 1993, General Morillon made his way into the
town without permission from his own superiors back in New York.
268
While he was in Srebrenica, the shelling had stopped, and when he
tried to leave the next day he was surrounded by the women and chil-
dren of the town begging him to stay. 269 Finally the French General
gave up trying to leave and proclaimed to all "You are now under the
protection of the United Nations ... I will never abandon you."
270
His actions that day led to the creation of the first U.N. "safe area,"
in Srebrenica and approximately thirty square miles around it when
the Security Council passed Resolution 819 on April 16.271 The Security
Council's action came just in time, Srebrenica had been facing increased
attacks and was near surrender.2 7 2 The next month the Security Coun-
cil adopted Resolution 824 which extended the safe-area concept to
Sarajevo, Zepa, Tuzla, Gorazde and Bihac.
273
Putting a safe area into place proved to be difficult. At first 34,000
troops were called for, but soon that number was down to some 7,600
troops.274 Finding nations who were willing to provide the troops
proved to be difficult as well, 275 but finally the Dutch agreed to take on
the job and on March 3, 1994, Dutch forces began to replace the ap-
proximately 140 Canadian soldiers in Srebrenica. 276 And so it was that
by the summer of 1995 Srebrenica found itself demilitarized and
"guarded" by some 750 Dutch soldiers in light blue U.N. helmets.
But on July 11, 1995, Srebrenica fell to the Serbs. After the town
was overrun and its citizens either killed or forcefully moved out of the
new Serbian controlled region, the world seemed to renew its interest in
the conflict. The war ground to a halt half a year later when the Day-
ton-Paris Agreement was signed on December 14, 1995.277 Renewed
NATO airstrikes probably served to help the Muslims and Croats fight
267. See id. at 82-83. UNPROFOR stands for United Nations Protection Force.
UNPROFOR was assigned to all of the former Yugoslavia from February 1992 until April
1995, after which referred only to the forces in Bosnia. ROHDE, supra note 1, at xxi.
268. See id. at xv.
269. See HONIG & BOTH, supra note 25, at 86.
270. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at xv.
271. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/819 (1993). See ROHDE,
supra note 1, at xv.; HONIG & BOTH, supra note 25, at 95-97.
272. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at xv.
273. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/824 (1993). See HONIG
& BOTH, supra note 25, at 109.
274. See id. at 116.
275. See id. at 116-17.
276. See id. at 127.
277. See id. at 340-42.
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the Serbs back and end the siege on Sarajevo, thus pushing the Serbs
closer to the bargaining table. 278 Nevertheless, under the Agreement,
the former safe-areas of Srebrenica and Zepa are now under Bosnian
Serb control. 279 Some 60,000 NATO troops were initially sent in to en-
force the peace, including some 20,000 Americans.
28 0
At the same time that the negotiations were taking place in Dayton
in November, both Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and Gen-
eral Ratko Mladic were indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal for crimes
relating to the massacres of Srebrenica. 28 ' They are still at large.
28 2
President Clinton has only recently extended indefinitely the mission of
the United States military in Bosnia, after having already extended the
first deadline he had set for the withdrawal, though by now the US
presence is down to about 8,500 troops.28 3 While it is clear that the
NATO imposed peace has worked, it is unclear how long it will last
when the troops leave.
28 4
V. CONCLUSION
Why focus so much of a paper on the proceedings of the ICJ on the
history and current state of the war in Bosnia? In reading the ICJ's or-
ders and judgments concerning this case it is too easy to forget what is
really at issue - the lives of thousands of innocent people. Twice in 1993
the ICJ ordered that nothing be done to exacerbate the situation in
Bosnia, yet two years later, a year before the Court was to finally estab-
lish its jurisdiction, Srebrenica fell and thousands were killed.
It is the ghastly events which took place in Srebrenica that haunt
me every time I think about the role of the ICJ in the dispute. What
good is the ICJ, I ask myself, if it cannot even get to the merits on a
case of such urgency as this one? In this respect I am comforted to
know that there are those on the Court who share my concern, as ex-
pressed by Judge Koroma's Separate Opinion to the Order of 17 Decem-
ber 1997,285 and Vice-President Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion on
278. See id. at 338-339.
279. See id. at 342.
280. See Whitney, supra note 34.
281. See ROHDE, supra note 1, at 342. While the Tribunal has issued indictments for
74, as of the summer of 1997, only 7 were in custody. John Kim, International Institu-
tions, 31 INT'L LAW. 671, 675-76 (1997). In November of 1996 the tribunal convicted Dra-
zen Erdemovic, who had pled guilty, for participating in the mass executions of the vic-
tims of Srebrenica. Id. at 676.
282. See Kevin Whitelaw, et al., It's Tricky Going In And Trickier Getting Out, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8333185.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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the same Order.28 6 Yet, even their comments on the need to reach a
conclusion to the case came only after the case had been in The Hague
nearly five years and after the war had been brought to a prayed for
end.
I am not convinced that the Court will ever issue a final ruling on
the merits in the near future. Too many things could happen to further
delay the conclusion of the case, or derail it altogether. But should such
a time arrive, I still hope that by settling through documentation the
responsibility of those who are accused of Genocide, the Court will help
create a permanent record for future generations to learn from. That
was the triumph of Nuremberg, though the hope that by documenting
the genocide of the Holocaust such acts would not be allowed again has
not materialized in light of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. Addition-
ally, should the Court find for Bosnia, perhaps it could order Yugoslavia
to pay damages and contribute to the rebuilding of the country, even if
no amount of money could ever undo the nightmares.
Ultimately, the future of the Bosnian people, be they Croat, Serb or
Muslim will rest in the hands of men like Mevludin Oric. Despite the
horror of surviving a mass execution and the fact that of the forty-five
men from his small village outside Srebrenica only 15 survived the trek
to safety, he says he is willing to live again with Serbs. 28 7 What Bosnia
needs is a good dose of men like Oric who are willing to move on and
stop the cycle of bloodshed. It will be courageous men and women like
him who will determine the fate of the Balkans as the new century ap-
proaches, not the War Crimes Tribunal, NATO, or even the ICJ.
286. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
287. ROHDE, supra note 1, at 386. Rohde tells of one night in March of 1996 when Oric
put his arm around the man to left, saying "This man is my greatest friend and he is a
Croat." Doing the same to the man to his right he said, "This man is my greatest friend
and he is a Serb." Pulling them both close he concluded, "This is my Bosnia, this is my
Bosnia." Id.
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